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Abstract
Introduction: On May 26, 2009, the first confirmed case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (pH1N1) infection in Hunter New
England (HNE), New South Wales (NSW), Australia (population 866,000) was identified. We used local surveillance data to
estimate pH1N1-associated disease burden during the first wave of pH1N1 circulation in HNE.
Methods: Surveillance was established during June 1-August 30, 2009, for: 1) laboratory detection of pH1N1 at HNE and
NSW laboratories, 2) pH1N1 community influenza-like illness (ILI) using an internet survey of HNE residents, and 3) pH1N1-
associated hospitalizations and deaths using respiratory illness International Classification of Diseases 10 codes at 35 HNE
hospitals and mandatory reporting of confirmed pH1N1-associated hospitalizations and deaths to the public health service.
The proportion of pH1N1 positive specimens was applied to estimates of ILI, hospitalizations, and deaths to estimate
disease burden.
Results: Of 34,177 specimens tested at NSW laboratories, 4,094 (12%) were pH1N1 positive. Of 1,881 specimens from
patients evaluated in emergency departments and/or hospitalized, 524 (26%) were pH1N1 positive. The estimated number
of persons with pH1N1-associated ILI in the HNE region was 53,383 (range 37,828–70,597) suggesting a 6.2% attack rate
(range 4.4–8.2%). An estimated 509 pH1N1-associated hospitalizations (range 388–630) occurred (reported: 184), and up to
10 pH1N1-associated deaths (range 8–13) occurred (reported: 5). The estimated case hospitalization ratio was 1% and case
fatality ratio was 0.02%.
Discussion: The first wave of pH1N1 activity in HNE resulted in symptomatic infection in a small proportion of the
population, and the number of HNE pH1N1-associated hospitalizations and deaths is likely higher than officially reported.
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Introduction
On May 26, 2009, the first confirmed case of infection with
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (pH1N1) in a resident of Hunter
New England (HNE) Area Health Service, Australia was
identified. HNE is a region located in the northeast of the
Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) which covers a
geographic area of 130,000 square kilometers and has a
population of approximately 866,000 people whose public health
needs are served by Hunter New England Population Health
(HNEPH) [1]. Upon identification of the introduction of pH1N1
to Australia, HNEPH rapidly established multiple surveillance
systems to track and determine the impact of circulation of the
pandemic virus in the community. Use of available influenza
syndromic surveillance and virologic surveillance data has been
proposed as one method to quantify disease burden in a pandemic
when cases of infection rise rapidly and disease burden can no
longer be estimated using confirmed case counts [2]. We used data
from complementary surveillance systems in HNE to estimate the
disease burden resulting from pH1N1 circulation and to describe
the first wave of pH1N1 activity, including laboratory detection of
pH1N1 virus, community influenza-like illness, hospitalizations,
and deaths, over a three month period from June 1-August 30,
2009.
Materials and Methods
Laboratory Confirmed pH1N1 Virus Infection
New South Wales Virologic Data. The two reference
laboratories in NSW are South Eastern Area Laboratory
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Research (ICPMR) based in Sydney. NSW Department of Health
conducted influenza virologic surveillance at SEALS, ICPMR,
and five NSW government operated laboratories. NSW
surveillance laboratories received specimens taken from persons
seeking medical care in NSW, and results of influenza diagnostic
testing (excluding rapid antigen and serologic testing) were
published on the internet each week [3]. Using the results of
influenza diagnostic tests at NSW surveillance laboratories during
May 30–August 28, we calculated the weekly proportion of
respiratory specimens tested for influenza viruses that were positive
for pH1N1 virus, with 95% confidence intervals for a standard
distribution based on the number of specimens tested. Specimens
included those submitted by general practitioners evaluating
persons presenting for outpatient care or from clinicians treating
Emergency Department (ED) or hospitalized patients.
Hunter Area Pathology Service Virologic Data. Hunter
Area Pathology Service (HAPS) is one of the five commercial
laboratories participating in NSW surveillance and provides
influenza diagnostic testing for 31 of the 35 hospitals in the
HNE area with EDs where patients with respiratory illness are
evaluated. HAPS also provides diagnostic testing for a number of
hospitals in northern and western NSW. During June 1–14, 2009,
all respiratory specimens that were positive for influenza A viruses
by real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-
PCR) at HAPS were sent to the two state reference laboratories in
Sydney for further testing for pH1N1. On June 15, 2009, HAPS
began rRT-PCR testing for pH1N1, and subsequently, the
majority of local respiratory specimens were tested by HAPS for
influenza A and B, and specimens that were found to be positive
for influenza A were tested for pH1N1. Using specimens from
patients seen in EDs and/or hospitalized at HNE hospitals, we
calculated the weekly proportion of specimens that were positive
for pH1N1 virus infection with 95% confidence intervals assuming
a standard distribution for June 15-August 30, 2009.
Community Illness Surveillance
FluTracking is an on-line community health syndromic
surveillance system established in 2006 which monitors rates of
influenza-like illness (ILI) (defined as the presence of self-reported
fever and cough) among residents of all six states and two
territories in Australia [4,5]. Many FluTracking participants in
Hunter New England are employees or family members of
employees of Hunter New England Area Health Service. During
each week of the influenza season, from May through October,
FluTracking participants receive a weekly email with a hyperlink
to their FluTracking web-based accounts encouraging them to
complete a brief, 10–15 second survey collecting information
about the presence of ILI during the previous week. FluTracking
participants may enroll and complete surveys for other members
of their households, and enrollment continues throughout the
influenza season. At the start of the 2009 influenza season, there
were approximately 1,800 individual FluTracking participants in
HNE accounting for approximately 0.2% of the HNE population.
To calculate the weekly point estimate of FluTracking
participants with pH1N1-associated influenza-like illness (ILI),
we multiplied the weekly point estimate of the proportion of
specimens positive for pH1N1 virus from NSW virologic data by
the weekly number of FluTracking participants reporting ILI:
Estimated # of FluTracking participants with pH1N1-
associated ILI ~ % of specimens positive for pH1N1 ð at
NSW laboratoriesÞ x( # of FluTracking participants with ILI
To calculate low and high estimates of FluTracking participants
with pH1N1-associated ILI, we performed the same calculation
with the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of the proportion
of NSW laboratory specimens positive for pH1N1 virus. To
determine the weekly estimate of HNE residents with pH1N1-
associated ILI, we multiplied the weekly estimate of FluTracking
participants with pH1N1-associated ILI by the population of HNE
(866,565 persons per 2008 Australian census data) divided by the
number of HNE FluTracking participants who completed a survey
for the week:
Estimated # of HNE residents with pH1N1-associated ILI ~
FluTracking participants with pH1N1-associated ILI ðÞ x 866, ð
565= # of FluTracking participants who completed survey ðÞ Þ
Hospitalization Surveillance and Burden Estimates
Reported Hospitalizations. During the 2009 influenza
season, hospitals were asked to report all persons hospitalized
with confirmed pH1N1 infection to HNEPH. Reported cases were
entered into a web-based database called NetEpi. Reported cases
with a positive test date from June 1–August 30, 2009 were
identified through review of data from the NetEpi database.
Estimated Hospitalizations. In addition, HNEPH estab-
lished population-based surveillance for hospitalizations due to
respiratory illness at all 35 HNE hospitals with emergency
departments (EDs). Hospitalizations were identified based on
one of eight ED International Classification of Diseases 10 (ICD-
10) discharge codes (Table 2). The eight ICD-10 codes were
chosen by retrospectively reviewing coding practices for
respiratory illness at the 35 HNE hospitals during previous
influenza seasons to select the most frequently used codes during
previous seasons. Of patients admitted for any illness to the 35
surveillance hospitals during 2002–2007 (n=160,204 to 179,132),
96% were residents of HNE each year. Therefore, we assumed
that 96% of persons admitted for respiratory illness in HNE during
the 2009 influenza season were residents of HNE.
To determine a weekly point estimate of pH1N1-associated
hospitalizations among HNE residents, we multiplied the propor-
Table 1. Data Sources Used For Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
Disease Burden Estimates.
Data Sources
Community ILI 1) FluTracking syndromic surveillance for influenza-like
illness
2) New South Wales virologic data
Hospitalizations 1) Reported hospitalizations
2) ICD-10 acute respiratory illness hospitalization
surveillance
3) HAPS virologic data from ED and hospitalized patients
Deaths 1) Reported deaths
2) ICD-10 acute respiratory illness deaths surveillance
3) HAPS virologic data from ED and hospitalized patients
HAPS: Hunter Area Pathology Service; ED: Emergency Department.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.t001
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data by the weekly number of hospitalizations identified through
the ICD-10 surveillance system:
Estimated # of HNE pH1N1-associated hospitalization for
acute respiratoryillness ~ % of HAPS specimens tested ð
for pH1N1 that were positive for pH1N1Þ x
# of HNE hospitalizations for acuterespiratory illness ðÞ x
96% of hospitalizations ðÞ
To determine low and high estimates of the weekly number of
pH1N1-associated hospitalizations among HNE residents, we
performed the same calculation with the bounds of the 95%
confidence intervals of the proportion of HAPS specimens positive
for pH1N1. During June 1-June 14, HAPS data on the proportion
of specimens positive for pH1N1 were not available because
HAPS was not performing the pH1N1 rRT-PCR assay.
Therefore, we substituted the proportion positive from NSW
laboratory data for the period June 1-June 14 for the above
calculation and the calculation of the estimated number of
pH1N1-associated deaths described below.
Mortality Surveillance and Burden Estimate
Reported Deaths. During the 2009 influenza season,
hospitals and coroners were asked to report all persons who died
with confirmed pH1N1 infection to HNEPH, and reported cases
were entered into NetEpi. Reported persons with a death date
from June 1-August 30, 2009 were identified through review of
data from the NetEpi database.
Estimated Deaths. In addition, HNEPH established
population-based surveillance for deaths due to respiratory
illness at the same 35 HNE hospitals included in the ICD-10
hospitalization surveillance system. Deaths were identified by
reviewing hospital death lists and identifying patients with the
same eight ICD-10 ED discharge codes for acute respiratory
illness used for hospitalization surveillance (Table 2). As with
hospitalizations, we assumed that 96% of deaths identified through
hospitalization surveillance were residents of HNE. To determine
a point estimate of the weekly number of pH1N1-associated deaths
among HNE residents, we multiplied the proportion of specimens
positive for pH1N1 from HAPS data by the weekly number of
HNE respiratory illness deaths identified through the surveillance
system:
Estimated # of HNE pH1N1-associated respiratory illness
deaths ~ % of HAPS ð specimens tested for pH1N1 that
were positivefor pH1N1Þ x # of HNE ð
respiratory illness deathsÞ x 96% ofhospitalizations ðÞ
Deaths with confirmed pH1N1 infection which occurred in
residents of aged and long- term care facilities are not identified
through this surveillance system. Therefore, deaths with confirmed
pH1N1 infection reported to HNEPH from these facilities were
added to the weekly total number of pH1N1-associated deaths.
Human Subjects Review
Surveillance data and laboratory data used in this analysis were
collected as part of public health response, and thus, data
collection was not subject to institutional review board approval
for human research protections. Patient identifiers were not
included in data collection, and all data were analyzed in
aggregate.
Results
Virologic Data
During May 30–August 28, 2009, 34,177 specimens were tested
for influenza viruses by SEALS, ICPMR, and five NSW pathology
services, and of those, 7,485 (22%) were positive for influenza A
virus, and 4,094 specimens (12% of all specimens tested for
influenza viruses, 55% of specimens testing positive for influenza A
viruses) were positive for pH1N1. The proportion of specimens
positive for pH1N1 increased from 0.8% (CI 0–0.8%) (during May
30–June 5) to 22% (CI 20–24%) (during June 27–July 3) (Table 3)
and subsequently declined.
During June 15–August 30, 2009, 1,881 specimens from
patients evaluated in HNE emergency departments and/or
hospitalized in HNE hospitals were submitted to HAPS labora-
tories for testing for influenza viruses by rRT-PCR; of those
specimens, 725 (39%) were positive for influenza A viruses, and
524 (26% of all specimens tested for influenza viruses, 72% of
specimens testing positive for influenza A viruses) were positive for
Table 2. Emergency Department ICD-10 Codes Used For Surveillance for Hospitalizations and Deaths Due To Acute Respiratory
Illness.
Code Diagnosis
% of Hospitalized Cases
(N=2113 )
% of Death Cases
(N=50)
J11 Influenza, virus not identified 0% 0%
J11.1 Influenza with other respiratory manifestations, virus not identified 27% 2%
J11.8 Influenza with other manifestations, virus not identified 25% 0%
J12.9 Viral pneumonia, unspecified 1% 0%
J15.9 Bacterial pneumonia, unspecified 1% 0%
J18.9 Pneumonia, unspecified 32% 72%
J22 Unspecified acute lower respiratory infection 12% 6%
J96.9 Respiratory failure, unspecified 2% 20%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.t002
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increased from 3% to 36% during weeks 3–8 of the outbreak (June
15–July 26) and peaked at 36% and 34% during weeks 8 and 9 of
the outbreak (July 20–August 2) (Table 3).
Community Illness
During June 1–August 30, 2009, the estimated number of
persons with pH1N1-associated ILI in HNE was 53,383 (range
37,828–70,597) suggesting a pH1N1 attack rate of 6.2% (range
4.4–8.2%) (Table 4). The number of persons with pH1N1-
associated ILI peaked during week 5 of the outbreak (June 29–July
5), remained elevated during weeks 6 and 7 of the outbreak (July
6–19), and then declined during subsequent weeks (Figure 1).
Hospitalizations
During June 1–August 30, 2009, 184 persons hospitalized with
confirmed pH1N1 infection were reported to HNEPH, and 509
pH1N1-associated hospitalizations (range 388–630) were estimat-
ed using ICD-10 hospitalization surveillance data. The estimated
number of pH1N1-associated hospitalizations increased rapidly
during weeks 5–8 of the outbreak (June 29–July 26) and peaked
during week 8 of the outbreak (July 20–26) (Figure 1). Based on
reported hospitalizations and calculated estimates using hospital-
izations identified through ICD-10 surveillance, the rate of
pH1N1-associated hospitalization ranged from 21 to 73 hospital-
izations per 100,000 persons. Based on point estimates of pH1N1-
associated community illness and pH1N1-associated hospitaliza-
tions, approximately 1 in 105 persons with pH1N1 infection was
hospitalized resulting in a case hospitalization ratio of 1%
(Figure 2).
Deaths
During June 1-August 30, 2009, five deaths reported to
HNEPH had confirmed pH1N1 infection (none occurred in aged-
or long-term care facilities, but one occurred in the community
with pH1N1 infection confirmed at autopsy), and 10 deaths (range
8–13) associated with pH1N1 infection were estimated using ICD-
10 mortality surveillance data. Using the reported number of
Table 3. Incidence of Specimens Positive for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 At New South Wales (NSW)[1] and Hunter Area Pathology
Service (HAPS) Laboratories, June 1-August 30, 2009.
NSW Specimens HAPS Specimens
(N=34,177) (N=1,881)
Week* n % Positive for pH1N1 n % Positive for pH1N1
1 6/1–6/7/2009 2157 1% (0–1%) – –
2 6/8–6/14/2009 2886 3% (3–4%) – –
3 6/15–6/21/2009 3615 6% (5–7%) 30 3% (0–9%)
4 6/22–6/28/2009 3478 9% (8–10%) 84 14% (7–21%)
5 6/29–7/5/2009 2824 22% (20–24%) 130 23% (16–30%)
6 7/6–7/12/2009 3499 19% (18–20%) 231 26% (20–32%)
7 7/13–7/19/2009 3356 18% (17–19%) 341 27% (22–32%)
8 7/20–7/26/2009 3755 17% (16–18%) 302 36% (31–41%)
9 7/27–8/2/2009 2637 16% (15–17%) 257 34% (28–40%)
10 8/3–8/9/2009 1918 9% (8–10%) 193 24% (18–30%)
11 8/10–8/16/2009 1499 9% (8–10%) 162 23% (17–29%)
12 8/17–8/23/2009 1424 7% (8–9%) 151 23% (16–30%)
13 8/24–8/30/2009 1129 5% (4–6%) 136 13% (7–19%)
*Dates reflect start and end dates for weekly HAPS laboratory data. Weekly NSW laboratory data were available for weeks with a start and end date 2 days prior to the
dates for HAPS laboratory data (for example, week 1 5/30–6/5/2009).
1. Weekly Influenza Epidemiology Report, NSW. 2009. (Accessed September 8, 2009, 2009, http://www.emergency.health.nsw.gov.au/swineflu/resources/pdf/
case_statistics_020909.pdf.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.t003
Table 4. Reported and Estimated Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Disease Burden, June 1–August 30, 2009, Hunter New England, New
South Wales.
Reported Number Calculated Number
Estimated Rate Per
100,000* Case Ratio**
Deaths 5 10 (8–13) 0.6 to 1.5 0.009% to 0.02%
Hospitalizations 184 509 (388–630) 20 to 73 0.3% to 1%
Community Illness --- 53,383 (37,828–70,597) 4,365 to 8,147 ---
*Rate ranges calculated using reported number (when available) and upper bound of calculated number.
**Case fatality and case hospitalization ratio ranges calculated using reported number and calculated point estimate of deaths and hospitalizations divided by
calculated point estimate of community illness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.t004
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estimate of community illness, the case fatality ratio (CFR) ranged
from 0.009% for reported, confirmed pH1N1-associated deaths to
0.02% for estimated deaths.
Discussion
The first wave of infection with pH1N1 among residents of
Hunter New England, New South Wales resulted in an estimated
53,383 influenza-like illnesses, 509 hospitalizations, and up to 10
deaths among the approximately 866,000 residents of HNE during
a 13 week period. Based on these estimates, approximately 1 in 16
HNE residents had symptomatic pH1N1 infection during the
surveillance period, and 1 in 1700 HNE residents required
hospitalization for pH1N1-associated illness.
Compared to the typical influenza season in HNE which occurs
from June through October and peaks in August or September,
the first wave of pH1N1 activity began and peaked earlier during a
three week period in early July. A similar trend towards an earlier
peak in the influenza season was also observed in the southern
Australian state of Victoria [6]. Compared to the peak of pH1N1
community illness in HNE, the peak in pH1N1-associated
hospitalizations lagged by 1–2 weeks which may be due in part
to a delay between illness onset and presentation for medical care
and varied transmission patterns influenced by social networks
with initial transmission among healthy children and later
Figure 1. Community ILI, Hospitalizations, and Deaths Associated with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus Infection, Hunter New
England, New South Wales, June 1-August 30, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.g001
Figure 2. Estimated Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Disease Burden, Hunter New England, New South Wales, June 1-August 30, 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009880.g002
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burden of community illness and pH1N1-associated hospitaliza-
tions in HNE increased rapidly resulting in clear peaks, pH1N1-
associated deaths occurred more sporadically.
In this analysis, the pH1N1 community ILI attack rate ranged
from 4–8%, similar to the estimated attack rate from New Zealand
(8%)[7] which experienced the introduction of pH1N1 during the
Southern Hemisphere influenza season. During May through
August, 2009, outbreaks of pH1N1 infection occurred throughout
the United States outside of the typical Northern Hemisphere
influenza season, and several estimates of ILI attack rate were
made. United States all-cause ILI attack rate estimates ranged
from 5% for a four week period in 10 states[8] to 7% for a four
week period in New York City [9]. In contrast to these estimates
from the United States, our estimate was adjusted using virologic
surveillance data suggesting that the ILI attack rate in HNE during
the influenza season was higher than in parts of the United States
where estimates were made when pH1N1 was circulating outside
of the United States influenza season. Attack rates from our
analysis, as well as those from most other analyses, underestimate
the true pH1N1 attack rate, because asymptomatic infections are
not included.
During the twentieth century, three influenza pandemics
occurred starting in 1918, 1957, and 1968. Of the twentieth
century pandemics, the 1918 pandemic was the most severe with
estimated attack rates for the full pandemic period ranging from
20–60% and estimated case fatality ratios ranging from 2–3%
[10,11]. In New South Wales, the 1918 pandemic virus was
estimated to result in 300 deaths per 100,000 persons [11]. In
comparison, the 1957 and 1968 pandemics were milder with case
fatality ratios estimated at less than 0.2% [10]. Our estimated
community attack rate of 4–8% and estimate of approximately 1
death per 100,000 persons with a case fatality ratios of 0.009–
0.02% suggest that compared to the 20
th century pandemics, the
first wave of the current pandemic resulted in clinical infection in a
smaller proportion of the population and in fewer severe
outcomes. However, our estimates reflect only the first wave of
symptomatic pH1N1 activity while estimates from prior pandem-
ics frequently reflect the result of multiple waves of pandemic virus
activity. Thus, it remains difficult to predict the overall disease
burden that will result from pH1N1.
Our model for estimating pH1N1 disease burden in HNE has
several strengths. First, because the Hunter New England
community is a well- defined population with a limited number
of hospitals where persons with acute respiratory illness are
hospitalized, HNEPH was able to implement population-based
surveillance for acute respiratory illness hospitalizations and
deaths, eliminating the need to extrapolate estimates from a
limited sample of the population. HNE hospitals also maintained a
consistent catchment area allowing us to easily adjust for
hospitalizations of non-HNE residents prior to calculating
hospitalization and mortality rates. Second, as surveillance for
community illness was internet-based and surveillance for
hospitalizations and deaths was based on ICD-10 codes from
electronic medical record systems, surveillance data was readily
available allowing for a rapid estimate of disease burden and
severity.
The limitations of our model reflect the constraints inherent in
each of the surveillance systems used for estimating each measure
of pH1N1 burden: detection of pH1N1, community illness,
hospitalizations, and deaths. First, both sources of laboratory data
were based on specimens collected and sent at the discretion of the
evaluating physician, and thus were affected by clinician testing
practices. In particular, the NSW laboratory data used to estimate
the incidence of pH1N1 in the community may have been affected
by the shift in the Australian pandemic phase from CONTAIN to
PROTECT on June 17, 2009 [12], after which clinicians were
advised to focus testing on hospitalized patients and on persons
with characteristics conferring a higher risk for severe influenza.
However, given the number of specimens submitted for testing at
the two NSW reference laboratories and five pathology services
compared to the reported number of hospitalizations in NSW [3],
it is likely that the majority of specimens were taken from non-
hospitalized persons. We also assumed that the incidence of
pH1N1 infection was similar among persons with respiratory
illness who sought outpatient medical care and among persons
with respiratory illness who did not seek medical care. Second,
since the majority of participants in the FluTracking surveillance
system are employees of the HNE Area Health Service,
FluTracking participants may differ from the general HNE
population with respect to socioeconomic status and educational
background which would affect our estimates of the burden of
pH1N1-associated community ILI if these factors were associated
with influenza transmission. Third, our estimates of pH1N1-
associated hospitalizations and deaths are based on surveillance for
hospitalizations and deaths using ICD-10 codes for respiratory
illness which are less likely to capture persons with pH1N1 who
have cardiovascular presentations or exacerbations of underlying
illnesses. An analysis of ICD-10 codes assigned to reported,
confirmed case-patients with pH1N1-associated hospitalizations
admitted from HNE EDs found that 50% of reported cases were
captured by one of the surveillance ICD-10 codes, while the
remaining 50% of cases were assigned a broad range of codes
[unpublished data], making it difficult for syndromic surveillance
to capture these undetected cases while achieving adequate
specificity. Surveillance ICD-10 codes also were selected by
retrospective review of codes used during prior influenza seasons
when coding practices may have been different than during the
current pandemic. Lastly, it should be noted that virologic data
from ED patients and hospitalized patients was used to calculate
our estimates of pH1N1-associated deaths. It is unclear how this
might bias our estimates if the proportion of persons with pH1N1
differed among persons who were hospitalized with respiratory
illness and those who died with respiratory illness.
This analysis was also unable to explore age-specific differences
in disease burden because the number of hospitalizations and
deaths was relatively small resulting in small numbers in each age
stratum. Seasonal influenza community attack rates and hospital-
ization and mortality rates have been shown to vary substantially
by age [13,14,15]. In addition, the age distribution of confirmed
pH1N1 cases from many countries suggests that people aged 65
years and older may be at lower risk for pH1N1 infection, and are
underrepresented among pH1N1-associated hospitalizations and
deaths when compared to seasonal influenza [16,17,18]. In this
analysis, approximately 20% of hospitalizations and 84% of deaths
identified through ICD-10 surveillance occurred in persons aged
65 years and older. If the incidence of pH1N1 infection is lower
among persons aged older than 65 years, then we may have over-
estimated deaths, and possibly hospitalizations, by applying non-
age-specific virologic data to hospitalizations identified through
ICD-10 surveillance. However, despite this potential limitation,
our estimated case fatality ratio is relatively low compared to prior
pandemics and consistent with estimates from other countries
[7,19].
We estimate that pH1N1 had an attack rate of 4–8% and a case
fatality ratio of 0.009–0.02% during the first wave of pH1N1
activity in HNE, Australia. Our estimates are consistent with
estimated attack rates from New Zealand which experienced the
Pandemic Influenza Burden
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influenza season but may be higher than estimates from the first
wave of pH1N1 activity in the United States where pH1N1
introduction occurred outside of the influenza season. It remains
to be seen whether a second wave of pH1N1 activity will occur in
HNE during 2010 and whether the characteristics of the pandemic
virus and its host population will change resulting in a different
pattern of pH1N1 disease burden in HNE as the worldwide
pandemic progresses.
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